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SPEAK OF THE MISSING WITNESS, AND SURELY HE
SHALL APPEAR: THE MISSING WITNESS DOCTRINE AND
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFEND-
ANTS-State v. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d 479, 816 P.2d 718 (1991).
Carl T. Edwards
Abstract: In State v. Blair, the Washington Supreme Court held for the first time that
the state may use the missing witness doctrine against criminal defendants. Under the
missing witness doctrine, which provides a permissive inference based on a defendant's
failure to present available witnesses, prosecutors may now argue that a defendant failed to
call certain witnesses because the defendant feared that their testimony would have been
incriminating. This Note examines the court's decision in State v. Blair, the formulation
of the missing witness doctrine adopted by the court, and the common law origins of the
missing witness doctrine. This Note argues that the Blair court failed to examine the most
compelling constitutional issues raised by its use of the missing witness doctrine and con-
cludes that although the court correctly decided the issues presented in Blair, Washington
courts should narrowly interpret the holding of Blair and prohibit the use of the doctrine
against criminal defendants on constitutional grounds not addressed in State v. Blair.
What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another.
-Justice William 0. Douglas,
Griffin v. California1
At petitioner Daniel Blair's trial, the prosecution entered into evi-
dence a booklet containing hand-written lists of names with short-
hand notations and numbers beside them.2 The state contended that
this booklet was a ledger of Blair's illegal drug dealings.' In the prose-
cutor's closing argument, he referred to this booklet and suggested
that Blair had not called the people listed in the booklet to testify
because their statements would have incriminated him.4 The prosecu-
tor stated that there was a simple reason why Blair had not called
them all in, and that was because they would have said, "Yeah, I
bought dope from him, cocaine." 5 With the help of this "testimony"
from the missing witnesses, the jury convicted Blair for delivery of a
controlled substance.6
1. 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
2. State v. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d 479, 482, 816 P.2d 718, 720 (1991) (9-0 decision; no petition
for certiorari filed to U.S. Supreme Court).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 483-84, 816 P.2d at 720-21.
5. Id. at 484, 816 P.2d at 721.
6. Id.
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Blair appealed on grounds that the prosecutcr's comments had
improperly shifted the burden of proof and referred to facts not in
evidence.7 In State R. Blair, however, the Washington Supreme Court
analyzed the prosecutor's comments under the missing witness doc-
trine and held that the prosecutor had not shifted the burden of proof
by commenting on the defendant's failure to present witnesses. The
court concluded that the prosecutor had merely argued the permissive
inference provided by the missing witness doctrine.'
The Blair court, however, did not address a number of constitu-
tional issues raised by the use of the missing witness doctrine against
criminal defendants. In particular, the court failed to analyze the use
of the missing witness doctrine with respect to the defendant's rights
to confrontation and compulsory process under the Sixth Amend-
ment. Furthermore, the court failed to discuss the due process limita-
tions that apply to the use of common law inferences by the
prosecution as it attempts to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Washington courts should limit the holding of Blair to the issues
decided in that case and prohibit the use of the missing witness doc-
trine against criminal defendants on constitutional grounds not
addressed in Blair.
I. STATE V BLAIR: WHO WERE THE MISSING
WITNESSES AND WHAT DID THEY HAVE TO SAY?
Officers of the Bellingham Police Department knocked on Daniel
Blair's door with a search warrant in the predawn hours of March 8,
1988. 9 During the ensuing search, the officers seized a booklet con-
taining lists of names with shorthand notations and numbers beside
them.° The dispute that arose at trial over the contents of this book-
let eventually led to the supreme court's application of the missing
witness doctrine in Blair.
A. The History of State v. Blair
The state offered the booklet seized from Blair's room as evidence at
his trial, contending that it represented a crude business ledger, or
"crib sheet," of Blair's drug dealings." A police officer testified on
direct examination that he recognized some of the names in the book-
7. Id.
8. Id. at 487-88, 816 P.2d at 723.
9. Id. at 482, 816 P.2d at 720.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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let as persons "known in the narcotics trade."12 The officer also testi-
fied that some of the booklet's notations resembled "crib sheets" that
he had seen in other drug cases. 13 On cross-examination, the officer
conceded that he recognized only one name from the booklet and that
many of the booklet's notations did not appear to relate to cocaine
transactions. 14
Blair denied that the booklet referred to drug transactions.15 He
testified that the entries represented debts from card games, personal
loans, and miscellaneous travel arrangements, medical appointments,
and rent payments.1 6 Although he admitted that two of the entries
related to drug purchases, Blair denied selling cocaine for a profit. 7
To support his explanation, Blair called one of the persons listed in the
booklet to testify." That person said that his name appeared in the
book several times and that each entry represented a personal loan
that he had received from Blair. 1
9
In his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Blair
knew the people listed in the booklet could have proven his innocence
by testifying that the entries had nothing to do with the sale of
cocaine.20 Therefore, argued the prosecutor, the jury could reasonably
infer that Blair did not call them to testify because they would not
have corroborated his story.21 Referring to the missing witnesses, the
prosecutor said, "Why not... bring them all in and settle the matter?
.... [T]he reason is simple. He couldn't bring those people in to say
... 'Yeah, I bought dope from him, cocaine.' "22 The jury convicted
Blair on one count of possession and one count of delivery of a con-
trolled substance.23
Blair appealed the conviction for delivery on the grounds that
prosecutorial misconduct had denied him a fair trial.24 First, Blair
argued that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof by
12. Brief for Appellant at 11, State v. Blair, No. 23967-8-I (Wash. App. Aug. 27, 1990).
13. Id.
14. Id. Several of the amounts ranged from $3 to $10, which the officer stated would buy
very little cocaine. Ma.
15. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 483, 816 P.2d at 720.
16. Id. at 483, 816 P.2d at 720.
17. Id. at 482, 816 P.2d at 720.
18. Id. at 483, 816 P.2d at 720.
19. Id.
20. Id at 483-84, 816 P.2d at 720-21.
21. Id
22. Id. at 484, 816 P.2d at 721.
23. Id. Counsel made no objection to the prosecutor's remarks. Id at 481, 816 P.2d at 719.
24. Brief for Appellant at 1, State v. Blair, No. 23967-8-I (Wash. App. Aug. 27, 1990).
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commenting on his decision not to call more witnesses.25 Second, he
argued that the prosecutor referred to facts not in evidence when he
stated that the people in the booklet would have said, "Yeah, I bought
dope from him."26 The court of appeals held that the prosecutor had
improperly suggested that Blair had a duty to present proof of his
innocence if such evidence was available to him.27 Nonetheless, the
court affirmed Blair's conviction on grounds that Blair failed to make
a timely objection at trial when a curative instruction could have neu-
tralized the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's improper
comments.28
B. The Supreme Court's Decision: Enter the Missing Witness
Doctrine
Blair's petition for review presented the supreme court with a single
question: "Were the prosecutor's comments flagrant, ill-intentioned,
and prejudicial?"29 The supreme court accepted Blair's petition for
review, but rendered the question presented moot by reversing the
court of appeals on the underlying issue of prosecutorial misconduct.3 0
The court held that when the defense chooses to present evidence, the
prosecution may comment on the evidence presented by the defense
without shifting the burden of proof to the defendant."1 Stating that
the prosecutor was entitled to argue reasonable inferences from the
evidence presented, 2 the court held that a proper analysis of Blair's
appeal must consider the missing witness doctrine.33 Applying that
doctrine to the circumstances of Blair's case, the court concluded that
the prosecutor had merely argued the reasonable inference permitted
by the missing witness doctrine when he told the jury that Blair did
not call the missing witnesses because they would have identified him
as their drug dealer.3 4
25. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 484, 816 P.2d at 721.
26. Id
27. State v. Blair, No. 23967-8-I, slip op. at 13 (Wash. App. Aug. 27, 1990).
28. Id
29. Based on the court of appeal's decision that the prosecutor's comments had been
improper, Blair asked the supreme court to reverse, despite the lack of a timely objection, on
grounds that the comments were "flagrant, ill-intentioned, and prejudicial." Petition for Review
at 1, State v. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d 479, 816 P.2d 718 (1991) (No. 57669-6).
30. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 492, 816 P.2d at 725.
31. Id. at 491, 816 P.2d at 724-25.
32. Id. at 491, 816 P.2d at 725.
33. Id. at 487-88, 816 P.2d at 723.
34. Ia at 492, 816 P.2d at 725.
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II. THE MISSING WITNESS DOCTRINE
Before State v. Blair, Washington courts had traditionally applied
the missing witness doctrine only in civil trials when a party failed to
meet its burden of production, or in criminal trials when the prosecu-
tion failed to produce an important witness.35 In Blair, the court
departs from that tradition by permitting the prosecution to use the
traditional form of the missing witness doctrine against a criminal
defendant for the first time.36 This form of the missing witness doc-
trine can be traced back to the early 1700s, when courts frequently
used doctrines such as the missing witness doctrine to allocate the bur-
den of proof on certain issues to the party with the best access to
evidence.37
A. The Missing Witness Doctrine in the State of Washington
The Blair court adopted the following statement of the missing wit-
ness doctrine: "[W]here evidence which would properly be part of a
case is within the control of the party [in] whose interest it would
naturally be to produce it, and... he fails to do so,-the jury may
draw an inference that [the evidence] would be unfavorable to him.""
Prior to Blair, however, Washington courts had not applied this form
of the missing witness doctrine against criminal defendants.39 Courts
traditionally allowed prosecutors to comment on a criminal defend-
ant's failure to produce an alibi witness,' but did not permit the use of
the adverse inference of the missing witness doctrine.41 The Blair
35. See Washington Patterned Jury Instructions - Criminal 5.20 (noting that missing witness
instruction applies only against the state); see also State v. Davis, 73 Wash. 2d 271, 438 P.2d 185
(1968) (missing witness doctrine against state in criminal trial); Wright v. Safeway Stores, 7
Wash. 2d 341, 109 P.2d 542 (1941) (missing witness doctrine in civil trial).
36. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 487, 816 P.2d at 723.
37. See Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference-Quieting the Loud
Voicefrom the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REv. 137, 138-43 (1985).
38. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 485, 816 P.2d at 722.
39. The Blair court stated that the court of appeals previously found the missing witness
doctrine applicable to criminal defendants. Id. at 487, 816 P.2d at 723. While each of the three
cases cited in support of this proposition permitted some comment about a missing witness, none
of the cases actually permitted the prosecutor to argue the adverse inference of the missing
witness doctrine. See State v. Contreras, 57 Wash. App. 471, 788 P.2d 1114 (1990); State v.
Cozza, 19 Wash. App. 623, 576 P.2d 1336 (1978); State v. Green, 2 Wash. App. 57, 466 P.2d 193
(1970).
40. Courts have permitted comment on the absence of an alibi witness because defendants
asserting an alibi defense are required to come forward with evidence as to the alibi itself. Green,
2 Wash. App. at 69, 466 P.2d at 200.
41. Compare Blair with State v. Fowler, 114 Wash. 2d 59, 785 P.2d 808 (1990) (analyzing
similar circumstances without applying the missing witness doctrine against a criminal
defendant).
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court, however, stated that the majority of jurisdictions permit the
missing witness doctrine to be used against criminal defendants,42 and
held that the doctrine should apply to the circumstances of this case.43
The court traced its authority for using the doctrine against criminal
defendants back to Graves v. United States,4 an 1893 Supreme Court
decision that remains the leading case on the use of the missing wit-
ness doctrine in criminal cases.45
The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that important limi-
tations apply to the use of the missing witness doctrine.4' First, the
Blair court stated that the inference does not arise unless the prosecu-
tion establishes circumstances indicating a reasonable probability that
the defendant would not knowingly fail to produce the witness unless
the witness' testimony would be damaging.47 Next, the court stated
that the missing witness inference does not arise if the witness' testi-
mony would be unimportant or cumulative,48 if the witness' absence is
satisfactorily explained,49 if the missing witness is not competent to
testify,50 or if the witness is privileged from testifying.51 Finally, the
court stated that the inference does not apply if the witness is equally
available to both parties.52
42. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 486, 816 P.2d at 722. While courts have generally accepted the
doctrine's application in civil trials, Stier, supra note 37, at 149 n.53, many courts and
commentators have expressed concern about using the doctrine against defendants in criminal
trials. See, eg., Julie E. McDonald, Comment, Drawing an Inference from the Failure to Produce
a Knowledgeable Witness: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1422
(1973); see also United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1978); Harper v. B & W
Bandag Ctr., 311 S.E.2d 104, 106-7 (Va. 1984) (Russell, J., concurring).
43. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 487, 816 P.2d at 723.
44. 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
45. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d 2d. 1984). Graves provides
the classic statement of the missing witness doctrine: "[I]f a party has it peculiarly within his
power to produce witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he
does not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable."
Graves, 150 U.S. at 121.
46. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d. at 488, 816 P.2d at 723.
47. The court stated that this does not require the prosecution to show that the defendant has
engaged in any willful misconduct to suppress the testimony of competent witnesses. Id. A
sufficient suspicion that competent testimony had been willfully withheld arises whenever a
defendant fails to produce a witness under circumstances when it would be natural to expect to
hear from the witness. Id. (quoting State v. Davis, 73 Wash. 2d 271, 280, 438 P.2d 185, 190
(1968)).
48. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 488, 816 P,2d at 723.
49. Id. at 489, 816 P.2d at 723.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 489, 816 P.2d at 724.
52. Id. at 490, 816 P.2d at 724. Under the missing witness doctrine, a witness is "particularly
available" to the defendant if there is some community of interest or ties of affection that would
make it reasonable to expect the defendant to call the witness. Id The Blair court stated that
Vol. 67:691, 1992
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As a passing consideration, the court stated that prosecutors may
not use the missing witness doctrine if the use of the doctrine infringes
on the defendant's constitutional rights, such as the right to remain
silent.53 In the absence of a legitimate constitutional challenge, 54 how-
ever, the court held that the missing witness doctrine should now be
applied against criminal defendants.55
The supreme court concluded that the circumstances of Blair's case
satisfied the conditions of the missing witness doctrine because Blair
failed to produce the people listed in the booklet when it would have
been in his interest to do so.5 6 Since the court found that none of the
doctrine's limitations applied to the facts of Blair, the court held that
the prosecutor properly argued the missing witness inference5 7 when
he asserted that the uncalled witnesses would have said, "Yeah, I
bought dope from him."5
B. The Common Law Origins of the Missing Witness Doctrine
Common law courts of England and the United States have used
some form of the missing witness doctrine for more than 250 years.5 9
The doctrine originated at a time when the English courts used pre-
sumptions and inferences for two reasons.6 One type of common-law
inference gained acceptance primarily because of the strong probative
relationship between the facts proved and the fact presumed.61 The
second type of common-law presumption developed as a means of
allocating the burden of production among the parties based on con-
the missing witness doctine does not require the state to show that the witness was legally
unavailable to the state before arguing the adverse inference of the doctrine. Id.
53. Id. at 491, 816 P.2d at 724.
54. Id. at 490, 816 P.2d at 724.
55. Id. at 492, 816 P.2d at 725.
56. Id. at 487, 816 P.2d at 722-23.
57. Id. at 492, 816 P.2d at 725. While the supreme court held that the prosecutor's comments
were proper under the missing witness doctrine, the state's appellate briefs never mention the
missing witness doctrine or any of the relevant case authority. See Respondent's Statement of
Additional Authority, State v. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d 479, 816 P.2d 718 (1991) (No. 57669-6); Brief
for Respondent, State v. Blair, No. 23967-8-I (Wash. App. Aug. 27, 1990).
58. Blair, 117 Wash.2d at 484, 816 P.2d at 721.
59. Stier, supra note 37, at 139-42.
60. MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 343.
61. Id. An example of this first type of inference is the common-law doctrine that allows the
state to infer that a person found in possession of recently stolen property is the thief or, at the
very least, knows that the property was stolen. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845
(1973) (concluding that "common sense and experience" tell us that the petitioner was aware of
the high probability that the checks were stolen).
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venience of proof or access to evidence.62 In the absence of modem
discovery procedures, courts reasoned that the best evidence would be
produced at trial by placing the burden of production on the party
with the best access to the evidence. 63 This second type of inference
generally had a much weaker probative relationship between the facts
proved and the fact presumed, but the courts of 18th century England
knowingly sacrificed the accuracy of their fact-finding process in order
to compel the production of evidence at trial.6" The missing witness
doctrine is an example of this second type of presumption.
The missing witness doctrine, like the presumption against spolia-
tors 61 and the best evidence rule,6 6 developed as a means of preventing
the fabrication, suppression, or destruction of evidence.67 If a party
failed to produce a witness, the presumption of the missing witness
doctrine provided the lost testimony of the missing witness, to the det-
riment of the non-producing party.68 Although the probative relation-
ship between the failure to produce a witness and the actual content of
that witness's testimony is weak,6 9 courts used the missing witness
doctrine to compel parties to produce witnesses at trial.70 Courts per-
mitted the adverse inference to be drawn as a means of punishing
62. McCoRMIcK, supra note 45, § 343 ("[Just as the burdens of proof are sometimes
allocated for reasons of fairness, some presumptions are created to correct an imbalance resulting
from one party's superior access to the proof.").
63. Stier, supra note 37, at 141.
64. Id at 143. Courts of that era created presumptions for reasons unrelated to the factual
likelihood that the presumed fact follows from the proven fact. Leslie J. Harris, Constitutional
Limits on Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of Changing Concepts of Fundamental
Fairness, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 308, 316 (1986).
65. Stier, supra note 37, at 140-42. Courts applied the presumption against spoliators when a
party failed to produce evidence that had been within that party's control. The mere failure to
produce such evidence gave rise to a presumption that the evidence would have been
unfavorable. Id at 140.
66. MCCORMICK supra note 45, § 272 (noting that modem discovery procedures have
diminished the importance of the best evidence rule).
67. Stier, supra note 37, at 139-43.
68. The presumption against spoliators could be offered as affirmative proof of the lost
evidence, I d at 141, just as the missing witness doctrine allowed the fact-finder to conclude that
the actual testimony of the missing witness would have been unfavorable to the non-producing
party. Id. at 142.
69. McDonald, supra note 42, at 1427 ("[A] variety of considerations unrelated to guilt might
motivate him not to put a particular witness on the stand."); Stier, supra note 37, at 143 ("[A]
variety of inferences ... might be drawn from the failure to produce a witness .... "); see also
Tina M. Webster et al., Voices From an Empty Chair: The Missing Witness Inference and the
Jury, 15 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 31 (1991) (psychological study suggesting that the
inference of the missing witness doctrine is not a natural inference).
70. Stier, supra note 37, at 143.
698
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those who would attempt to benefit by suppressing the testimony of a
material witness.71
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NOT RAISED IN STATE V
BLAIR
The court applied the missing witness doctrine in State v. Blair
without addressing a number of constitutional issues related to the use
of the missing witness doctrine against a criminal defendant. First, the
missing witness doctrine provides an inference about the testimony of
uncalled witnesses. Therefore, the Confrontation Clause gives rise to
issues of availability and reliability. Second, the missing witness doc-
trine exists primarily to coerce the production of witnesses. As a
result, the use of the doctrine against a criminal defendant bears
directly on the defendant's right to present witnesses under the Sixth
Amendment. Finally, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment limits the manner in which the state may use permissive
inferences to help meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. The Confrontation Clause: Availability and Reliability
The first constitutional issue that the supreme court did not address
in State v. Blair is the defendant's right to confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment 2.7  The fundamental right protected by the Con-
frontation Clause is the literal right to confront the prosecution's wit-
nesses at the time of trial.73  The underlying purpose of the
Confrontation Clause is to help ensure the accuracy of the fact-finding
process by providing the defendant with an opportunity to test the
evidence brought forth by the prosecution.74 The Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case may warrant dispensing with actual confronta-
tion at trial.75 The Court has sought to accommodate the competing
interests of the accused and the state by strictly defining the circum-
stances under which the core values of the Confrontation Clause do
not strictly require a witness to be produced at trial."
71. Id.
72. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Confrontation Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
73. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970).
74. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).
75. Id. ("Every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law enforcement ... .
76. Id.
699
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The Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution to produce any
available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a criminal
trial,7 7 because the Sixth Amendment implies at the very least that the
evidence developed against a defendant shall come from the witness
stand in a public courtroom. 71 The Supreme Court has determined
that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to confronta-
tion in two distinct ways. 7 9 First, the prosecution must either produce
the witness whose statements it wishes to use against the defendant or
demonstrate that the witness is legally unavailable to testify.8" Before
a witness may be declared legally unavailable, the state must make a
good-faith effort to produce the witness at trial.81 Second, the prose-
cution must provide some indication that the testimony of the missing
witness is reliable.82 Before the state may refer to the statements of
any witness who does not testify at trial, the trier of fact must have
some basis for evaluating the truth of the missing witness' statement. 83
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Present Witnesses
A second constitutional issue that the Blair court did not address is
the right of an accused to present witnesses for the defense in an adver-
sarial criminal trial. The framers of the Constitution believed that
defendants should be guaranteed the right to present witnesses at
trial.4 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to compulsory
process so that the defendant's witnesses, as well as the prosecution's,
might be evaluated by the jury. 5 The right of an accused to present
witnesses to establish a defense is a fundamental element of due pro-
cess of law and stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth
Amendment rights.86
The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee merely that a defense
shall be provided for the accused;87 it grants to the accused the right to
77. Green, 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965).
79. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
80. Id.
81. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968); State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 170, 691
P.2d 197, 202 (1984).
82. Roberts 448 U.S. at 65.
83. Id
84. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20 (1967).
85. Id. The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CoNsTr amend. VI. The right to
compulsory process applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Washington, 388 U.S. at 18-19.
86. Washington, 388 U.S. at 18-19.
87. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).
700
Vol. 67:691, 1992
Missing Witness Doctrine
present a defense of a personal character.18  Taken together, the bun-
dle of rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment protects the most
fundamental values of due process within the adversarial setting of
American justice.89 The tactical privileges protected by the Sixth
Amendment may not be used as an "organ of the State interposed
between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself per-
sonally."' 9 The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment insist
that these tools shall be an aid to a willing defendant.91
C. Due Process and the Common Law Inference
The third constitutional issue the court did not address in State v.
Blair is the relationship between the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the state's use of common law inferences in
criminal trials. On the one hand, due process requires the state to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element required for convic-
tion.92 Both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion
remain with the state until the trier of fact enters a verdict.9" On the
other hand, common law courts of the 18th and 19th centuries devel-
oped presumptions as a means of distributing the burden of proof dur-
ing the course of a trial, either as a matter of convenience or to coerce
unwilling litigants to produce evidence. 94 American courts, however,
have adapted certain types of common law presumptions for use in
criminal trials as "permissive inferences." 95
A permissive inference operates essentially the same as a burden-
shifting presumption except that the burden of proof does not shift.96
With a permissive inference, the state may argue the existence of fact
B based on proof of fact A, 97 but the trier of fact is free to accept or
88. Id. at 819-20 (stating that the right "to make one's own defense personally [is] necessarily
implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment").
89. "The Sixth Amendment includes a compact statement of the rights necessary to a full
defense." Id. at 818. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
90. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.
91. Id.
92. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
93. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975).
94. See Stier, supra note 37, at 138-43.
95. MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 346. The Supreme Court uses the terms "permissive
inference" or "permissive presumption" to describe a statutory or common law presumption that
does not shift the burden of proof. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
96. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
97. Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1187, 1187 n.1 (1979).
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reject the inference based on all of the evidence produced at trial.98
Even when offered as a permissive inference, a common law inference
must still satisfy standards of due process "in light of present-day
experience." 99 First, criminal due process requires a rational connec-
tion, based on common sense and practical experience, between the
underlying facts and the inference itself. "'o Considering all of the evi-
dence in a particular case, a permissive inference will be constitution-
ally acceptable only if there is a rational way for the jury to draw the
inference suggested by the common law doctrine.101 Second, due pro-
cess prohibits the use of any common law inference based on the com-
parative convenience of requiring the defendant to produce evidence
on a particular issue.102 The fact that the defendant has better access
to the information, standing alone, does not justify the use of a permis-
sive inference to help meet the state's burden of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.10 a Due process requires the prosecution to bear the
burden of proof on issues that the defendant is better able to prove,
even though the prosecution may have great difficulty proving
them. 104
IV. THE MISSING WITNESS DOCTRINE DOES NOT SHIFT
THE BURDEN OF PROOF OR REFER TO FACTS
NOT IN EVIDENCE
In applying the missing witness doctrine, the Blair court addressed
only the issues raised in Blair's petition for review. Blair argued that
the prosecutor's comments had improperly shifted the burden of proof
and the prosecutor referred to facts not in evidence. 0 5 The supreme
court's analysis under the missing witness doctrine effectively negated
both of these arguments. First, the court rejected Blair's argument
that the prosecutor's comments impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof. 106 The court characterized the prosecutor's comments as the
permissive inference provided by the missing witness doctrine,0 7 and
a permissive inference, by definition, does not shift the burden of proof
98. Allen, 442 U.S. at 156.
99. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1973).
100. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157.
101. MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 347.
102. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
103. Id.
104. Harris, supra note 64, at 323.
105. State v. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d 479, 484, 816 P.2d 718, 721 (1991).
106. Id. at 491, 816 P.2d at 724-25.
107. Id.
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in a criminal trial.108 By allowing the prosecutor to argue that the
missing witnesses would have testified that Blair was a drug dealer, the
court placed a great deal of practical pressure on Blair to produce the
witnesses or more adequately explain their absence. In a technical
sense, however, Blair did not bear the burden of proof on this issue
because the jury remained free to reject the prosecutor's inference even
if Blair presented no evidence at all on this issue."0 9
Second, Blair's claim that the prosecutor's comments referred to
facts not in evidence failed to anticipate the manner in which the miss-
ing witness doctrine operates. Without the missing witness doctrine,
the facts in evidence did not provide a reasonable basis for inferring
that the missing witnesses would have incriminated Blair with their
statements.' 10 The missing witness doctrine, however, operates on this
same set of facts to infer the adverse "testimony" of the missing wit-
nesses."' According to the Blair court's analysis under the missing
witness doctrine, the prosecutor merely argued the proper inference of
the missing witness doctrine when he told the jury that the uncalled
witnesses would have identified Blair as their cocaine dealer. 1 2
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NOT RAISED IN STATE V.
BLAIR SHOULD PROHIBIT THE USE OF THE
MISSING WITNESS DOCTRINE AGAINST
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Although the court in Blair rejected the argument that the missing
witness doctrine impermissibly shifts the burden of proof in a criminal
trial, the court neither addressed nor decided a number of other con-
stitutional issues regarding the use of the missing witness doctrine in
Blair's trial. A broader analysis of the prosecutor's comments in Blair
reveals that the state's use of the missing witness doctrine violated
Blair's constitutional rights in three distinct ways. First, the prosecu-
tor violated Blair's right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment
108. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).
109. See id. at 156-57.
110. The court addressed a similar situation one year earlier in State v. Fowler, 114 Wash. 2d
59, 785 P.2d 808 (1990). In Fowler, the court held that prosecutorial speculation about the
absence of a defense witness constituted error as a reference to evidence not at issue. Id. at 66,
785 P.2d at 813. The court stated that it considered speculation of this type highly inappropriate
and contrary to the standards to which it held members of the bar. Id. The Blair opinion
disapproved of Fowler to the extent that Fowler is inconsistent with the application of the missing
witness doctrine. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 486-87, 816 P.2d at 722.
111. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (the missing witness doctrine provides
affirmative proof of the adverse testimony of the missing witnesses).
112. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 492, 816 P.2d at 725.
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by offering the "testimony" of witnesses who did not testify at Blair's
trial. Second, the prosecutor violated Blair's right under the Sixth
Amendment to present his own witnesses at trial by using a doctrine
that exists primarily to coerce the production of witnesses. Finally,
the court's use of the missing witness doctrine failed to comply with
due process limitations on the state's use of permissive inferences in
criminal trials.
Each of these constitutional violations provides a viable challenge to
the use of the missing witness doctrine against cririnal defendants in
the State of Washington. The Blair court did not explicitly decide
whether the use of the missing witness doctrine violates the Sixth
Amendment or fails to comply with the limitations placed on the use
of permissive inferences by the Due Process Clause. Washington
courts should therefore limit the precedential effect of Blair to the
issues decided in that case and prohibit the use of the missing witness
doctrine on constitutional grounds not considered by the Blair
court.
1 13
A. The Missing Witness Doctrine and the Confrontation Clause
The prosecutor in State v. Blair violated Blair's right to confronta-
tion under the Sixth Amendment when he told the jury that the people
listed in the booklet would have incriminated Blair by testifying that
they had purchased cocaine from Blair. With this comment, the pros-
ecutor offered evidence about the statements of witnesses whom the
state had made no effort to produce at Blair's trial. 1 This use of the
missing witness doctrine violated the Confrontation Clause in two
ways. First, the prosecutor offered this inference without showing that
the missing witnesses were legally unavailable to testify at Blair's trial.
Second, the missing witness doctrine does not provide the jury with an
adequate basis for evaluating the reliability of the testimony that the
prosecutor claimed the missing witnesses would have offered.
L The Missing Witnesses Must Be Legally Unavailable
Under the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution may not offer evi-
dence regarding the statements of any witness who does not appear at
trial without first demonstrating that a good faith effort has failed to
obtain the witness's presence.115 In Blair, however, the court held
113. See James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis 55 IND. L.J. 41, 61 (1979) ("If the
precedent ... did not consider the justifying rule of the case at bar. then in a real sense the
decisional court is pondering how to decide a question that has never been decided.").
114. Blair 117 Wash. 2d at 490, 816 P.2d at 724.
115. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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thiat the missing witness doctrine did not require the state to identify,
lo cate, or produce the missing witnesses before arguing the missing
witness doctrine.116 The Blair court stated that the missing witness
d.octrine required only a showing that the witnesses were available to
t he defendant and that some community of interest made it reasonable
t o expect the defendant to call the witnesses.I 7 The lower standard of
awailability required by the missing witness doctrine, however, does
i ot protect a defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth
,mUnendment.
Although the prosecution in Blair met the showing of availability
equired by the missing witness doctrine, the prosecution did not meet
the showing of unavailability required by the Confrontation Clause.
rhe Sixth Amendment requires the state to demonstrate with cer-
ainty that the missing witnesses were legally unavailable to testify
, efore offering evidence of their out-of-court statements.118 In Blair,
the state made no effort prior to trial to identify or locate any of the
persons listed in the booklet. 9 At trial, Blair provided the first and
last names of the people listed in the booklet, but the state still made
no effort to produce the witnesses. 20 There can be no exception to the
confrontation requirement of the Sixth Amendment unless the prose-
cution has made a good-faith effort to obtain the presence of the miss-
ing witnesses at trial.1 2  The availability requirement of the
Confrontation Clause should have prohibited the state's use of the
missing witness doctrine in Blair.
2 The Missing Witness Inference Must Be Reliable
In addition to showing that the missing witnesses are legally
unavailable, the Confrontation Clause requires the state to show some
particularized guarantee that the missing witness inference is trustwor-
thy before placing that inference before the jury. 122 The missing wit-
ness doctrine, however, is not sufficiently reliable to satisfy the
demands of the Confrontation Clause because the inference provided
by that doctrine suffers from a lack of actual probative value. Com-
mon law courts developed the arbitrary inference of the missing wit-
116. Blair. 117 Wash. 2d at 490, 816 P.2d at 724.
117. Id.
118. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash. 2d 165, 170-71, 691 P.2d 197, 202 (1984).
119. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d at 490, 816 P.2d at 724.
120. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 3, State v. Blair, 117 Wash. 2d 479, 816 P.2d 718
(1991) (No. 57669-6).
121. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
122. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
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ness doctrine more than 250 years ago in order to compel the
production of witnesses. Despite the lack of a rational connection
between the failure to produce a witness and the content of that wit-
ness' testimony,123 courts adopted the missing witness doctrine as ai
means of punishing litigants for failing to produce witnesses within
their control.1 24
The use of the missing witness doctrine against criminal defendants'
conflicts with the underlying values of the Confrontation Clause
because the missing witness doctrine weakens the reliability of the
fact-finding process. Simply as a matter of legitimate trial tactics,
criminal defendants may choose not to call witnesses for many reasons
unrelated to guilt or innocence. 2 ' The missing witness doctrine, how-
ever, arbitrarily presumes that only a guilty defendant would fail to
produce witnesses. Furthermore, the trier of fact has no basis for eval.
uating the reliability of the missing witness inference because it is vir..
tually impossible to evaluate the trustworthiness of pure,
hypothetical "testimony." Any form of hearsay evidence would be
more reliable than the missing witness inference, yet the confrontation
clause prohibits the use of most hearsay evidence. With the missing
witness inference, the prosecution must rely solely on suspicion and
innuendo to support the theory that the missing witnesses would have
incriminated the defendant if they had testified.
In Blair, the state provided no particular indication that the missing
witness inference was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the underlying val-
ues of the Confrontation Clause. Both parties offered an explanation
at trial regarding the contents of the booklet, and both parties had the
ability to call the people listed in that booklet to support their respec-
tive theories. The missing witness inference in this case was pure spec-
ulation based on the prosecutor's assertion that the booklet was a crib
sheet of Blair's drug dealings. The reliability requirement of the Con-
frontation Clause should have prohibited the use of the missing wit-
ness doctrine in Blair because the inference provided by that doctrine
is arbitrary, speculative, and unreliable.
123. Stier, supra note 37, at 143 ("[T]he failure to produce a witness... says nothing about
the content of a missing witness' testimony.").
124. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
125. The decision of counsel not to subpoena a witness is a matter cf legitimate trial tactics.
See State v. Thomas, 71 Wash. 2d 470, 429 P.2d 231 (1967).
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B. The Missing Witness Doctrine and the Right to Present
Witnesses
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the defendant's version of
the facts as well as the prosecution's shall be placed before the jury so
that the jury may determine for itself where the truth lies. 26 In the
adversarial process of American criminal justice, the defendant has the
right to choose the witnesses called to testify for the defense.1 27 Any
attempt to coerce the defendant's choice of witnesses should be forbid-
den as a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to present wit-
nesses. 28 The Supreme Court has held that the state may not thrust
counsel upon the accused, "against his considered wish," without vio-
lating the logic of the Sixth Amendment.1 29 The same should hold
true of the right to present witnesses: the state may not force a defend-
ant to produce witnesses without violating the Sixth Amendment.
The missing witness doctrine pursues its coercive mission by permit-
ting the prosecutor to draw an inference of guilt from the defendant's
failure to produce certain witnesses. 30 While Blair's right to present
witnesses is protected by the Sixth Amendment,3 1 the court permitted
the prosecutor to penalize Blair for exercising that right.1 32 The state
may not attempt to penalize a criminal defendant by drawing an
adverse inference of guilt from the exercise of a constitutional right.1 33
The Supreme Court has characterized this type of comment as "a rem-
nant of the inquisitorial system of justice."134 The use of the missing
126. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
127. Id. at 18.
128. The Contreras opinion, upon which Blair relies, states that "It]he absence of a duty to
call witnesses is not a specific constitutional right. It is a judicially developed corollary of the
State's burden to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Contreras, 57 Wash. App. 471, 473, 788 P.2d. 1114, 1115 (1990). This misses the point. The
issue is not whether a defendant has a duty to call witnesses, but whether a defendant has a right
not to call witnesses. Such a right is protected by the Sixth Amendment.
129. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
130. See Stier, supra note 37, at 143 (stating that courts used the missing witness doctrine to
punish "would-be spoliators")
131. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
132. Drawing such an adverse inference is "a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
133. When the State of California attempted to use a defendant's decision not to testify as the
basis for an adverse inference, the United States Supreme Court held that no adverse inference
may be drawn from a defendant's decision to exercise the Fifth Amendment right to silence. Id.
at 613-15. Similarly, when the State of Ohio attempted to draw an inference of guilt from a
defendant's decision to remain silent after hearing his Miranda rights, the Court held that the
state may not use a defendant's exercise of the rights guaranteed by Miranda to infer that the
defendant's story at trial is unreliable. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1976).
134. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
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witness doctrine against a criminal defendant violates the Sixth
Amendment by making it costly for the defendant to assert the right
to present witnesses.
Furthermore, the coercive nature of the missing witness doctrine
renders the doctrine fundamentally incompatible with the Sixth
Amendment. The common-law origins of the missing witness doc-
trine reveal that the purpose of the missing witness doctrine is to com-
pel the production of witnesses, 13 5  yet the Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendants the right to present a defense at trial free from
coercion by the state. Unless the courts of Washington perform some
type of doctrinal exorcism to cast out the spirit cf coerciveness that
has possessed the missing witness doctrine since its earliest origins, the
use of the doctrine against defendants in criminal trials will inevitably
violate the Sixth Amendment.
C. The Missing Witness Doctrine and Due Process
The arbitrary and coercive inference of the missing witness doctrine
fails to comply with the requirements of due process regarding the
state's use of permissive inferences in criminal trials. First, evidence
that a defendant has failed to produce a witness has no rational con-
nection to the claim that the missing witness' testimony would have
incriminated the defendant. 136 Second, the missing witness doctrine
does not have a basis in common-knowledge and practical experience.
Third, the missing witness doctrine rests firmly on the belief that it
would be easier for the defendant, rather than the state, to produce the
missing witnesses.137
First, the use of the missing witness doctrine in Blair violates due
process because there is no rational connection between the facts in
evidence and the prosecutor's assertion that the missing witnesses
would have identified Blair as their drug dealer. Commentators13 8 and
jurists139 alike have noted that the failure to produce a witness is an
ambiguous act. In choosing defense witnesses, Blair had to consider
135. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
136. The Supreme Court criticized a very similar doctrine, the presumption against
spoliators, in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), stating that the presumption against
spoliators is illogical unless the opposing party makes some showing that the nonproducing party
acted in bad faith to destroy evidence that actually might have been unfavorable to the non-
producing party.
137. See Stier, supra note 37, at 138-43.
138. McDonald, supra note 42, at 1427; see Stier, supra note 37, at 153.
139. United States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Every experienced trial
lawyer knows that the decision to call a witness often turns on factors which have little to do
with the actual content of [the] testimony.").
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questions of demeanor, credibility, and hostility."4 Blair might have
decided not to put a witness on the stand for fear that the witness
would be impeached as a result of a particularly damaging criminal
record, or because the witness was unpredictable or untrustworthy."'
Blair might have thought that calling one of the "missing" witnesses
would be sufficient, or he simply might have lacked the financial
resources to call a great number of witnesses. 142 The prosecutor's
decision not to call the missing witnesses, even after Blair provided
their full names, makes it even less likely that they would have incrim-
inated Blair.143 The prosecutor's failure to produce available witnesses
must be viewed in light of the state's duties under the Sixth Amend-
ment. So far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned, the prosecu-
tion, not Blair, was solely responsible for the absence of these
particular missing witnesses."4 On the facts presented in Blair, there
was no rational way that a juror could have drawn the inference sug-
gested by the prosecutor. Due process should have prohibited the
prosecution from using such an arbitrary inference to help meet its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, the missing witness doctrine violates due process because it
lacks a basis in practical experience or common knowledge. While
proponents of the doctrine characterize the missing witness inference
as natural or logical,145 a recent psychological study suggests that the
inference "is not as natural as it may seem."'" The psychologists
found that jurors in their study generally did not draw the missing
witness inference unless the judge or opposing counsel prompted them
140. Id.
141. McDonald, supra note 42, at 1427.
142. See Harper v. B & W Bandag Ctr., 311 S.E.2d 104, 107 (Va. 1984). Blair qualified for
assistance from the Washington Appellate Defenders Association on appeal. Telephone
Interview with Eric Broman, Washington Appellate Defenders Association, Seattle, Wash. (Feb.
6, 1992) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
143. Busic 587 F.2d at 586 ("[C]ases such as this... where both parties fail to call an
available witness... shatter the myth than an absent witness's testimony might be expected to be
particularly favorable to either side.").
144. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (stating that when the record reveals that the
state has failed to make a good faith effort to produce a witness, the sole reason for the witness'
absence is the state's failure to seek the witness' presence).
145. Stier, supra note 37, at 145 n.32 ("[Tihe missing witness rule... is more a product of
common sense than of the common law") (quoting UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1972)). Compare Stier's own text: "In their attempt to explain [the circumstances under
which] the inference is natural, the courts have produced a set of guidelines that are
extraordinary for their unnatural complexity, their ability to confuse, and their potential for
abuse." Id. at 146.
146. Webster et al., supra note 69, at 40.
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to do so.147 When the jurors were asked to consider only the evidence
presented at trial, they did not tend to draw the anticipated inference
based solely on their own practical experience and common knowl-
edge.148 The results of this study indicate that the missing witness
instruction distracts jurors from the facts in evidence and invites them
to speculate on matters not in evidence.149 The psychologists' conclu-
sion that the missing witness inference is not a "natural" inference
provides empirical evidence that the missing witness doctrine has no
basis in common sense and present-day experience. Due process pro-
hibits the state from using such an inference as it attempts to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial.
Third, the missing witness doctrine violates due process because it
rests firmly on the belief that defendants should be compelled to pro-
duce certain witnesses when it is easier or more convenient for the
defendant to produce those witnesses. 150 The missing witness doctrine
developed as burden-shifting device to allow courts to distribute the
burden of production to the parties with the best access to particular
witnesses. 5 ' Just as the doctrinal origins of the missing witness doc-
trine render the doctrine incompatible with the Sixth Amendment,
those same origins render its use against criminal defendants funda-
mentally inconsistent with modem notions of due process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court correctly decided the issues
presented in State v. Blair. However, the Blair court did not address a
number of constitutional issues related to the use of the missing wit-
ness doctrine against criminal defendants. First, the missing witness
doctrine provides an inference regarding the "testimony" of uncalled
witnesses without the showing of unavailability and reliability required
by the Confrontation Clause. Second, the missing witness doctrine is a
coercive doctrine that violates the Sixth Amendment right to present
witnesses by making the exercise of that right costly for the defendant.
Finally, the use of the missing witness doctrine adopted in Blair fails
to comply with due process limitations on the use of permissive infer-
ences in criminal trials.
-The Blair holding should be read very narrowly: the use of the
missing witness doctrine by the state in a criminal trial does not shift
147. Id. at 39.
148. Id. at 40.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
151. Stier, supra note 37, at 138-43.
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the burden of proof to the defendant. The precedential effect of Blair
should be limited to the issues decided in that opinion. Washington
courts, including the supreme court, should distinguish Blair on its
issues and prohibit the use of the missing witness doctrine on constitu-
tional grounds not decided in State v. Blair.
